Palestine - the failed peace process
So it's come down to this: the elected head of the Palestinian
nation pleads for 13 percent. Israel counters with an offer of
nine percent. Vested interests, in the guise of mediators,
attempt to fashion a deal: one percent here, one percent there.
Ultimately, Arafat's entreaties are rebuffed and he returns home
as he arrived - empty-handed.
The farcical outcome of the London Summit merely served to
underline the deeply-flawed nature of the Israeli-Palestinian
`peace process'. With each passing day it becomes clearer that
the Oslo Accords represent less a peace, than a pacification
process.
Thus we are treated to a spectacle akin to a parody of the
old-fashioned marketplace practice of haggling. It would be funny
were it not so sad. The focus of the `haggling' is after all, the
Palestinian nation - which celebrates its dispossession as Israel
celebrates its birth. Until that
skewed parallel is righted, attempts at peace in the Middle East
will represent little more than a postponement of conflict.
Mr Arafat arrived at the London Summit with nothing. He has
nothing to bargain with, save the possibility that he may be
unseated by his own. Having signed up to the `peace deal' he now
finds it empowers Israel in direct proportion to its
disempowerment of the Palestinians. There's that skewed parallel
in operation again.
He signed up to a deal supposedly based on the premise of land
for peace. In a perverse sense, the Israelis have adhered to the
central tenets of that deal. They continue to enjoy the peace
that military, economic and political superiority confers.
Meanwhile, they continue with the process of land confiscation
and settlement building. Israel enjoys both land and
peace. The Palestinians feed on occasional scraps. Israel had
always set out to negotiate such a deal, and for that they cannot
be faulted. In realpolitik terms, it is to be expected that
anyone entering negotiations will attempt to achieve as many of
their aims as possible.
That they did so was confirmed shortly after the signing of Oslo
II, in 1995. In conversation with the Chinese ambassador, the
Israeli president Ezer Weizmann delivered his assesment of the
agreement: ``We screwed the Palestinians.''
Israel's then Foreign Minister Ehud Barak was asked how the
Palestinians could have accepted the terms of the recently-signed
accord. Barak's assessment was precise. ``We are the ones with the
power,'' he replied. In looking closely at the terms of Oslo II -
the deal on which Chairman Arafat placed such emphasis - the
truth of those blunt Israeli analyses becomes clear.
The deal is concerned chiefly with the West Bank, the territorial
core for any putative Palestinian state. The territory is
divided, ostensibly for administrative purposes, into three
areas: Zones A, B and C. The former is under complete control of
the Palestinian Authority. It comprises, at a generous estimate, about two percent of the West
Bank's territory. Zone B consists of a scattering of Palestinian areas,
about 100 in all.
Here the Palestinians retain what is euphemistically called
``civil control'' - in other words, the Israeli army remains the
supreme authority. Under the terms of Oslo II, Israel retains an
effective power of veto over any law passed, or action proposed
by the Palestinian Authority in the Occupied Territories.
In fact, Zone B sits entirely within the wholly-Israeli
controlled Zone C. This Zone C represents some 70 percent of the
total area of the West Bank and is populated by 140,000 Jewish
settlers. The far smaller (and poorer) areas under Palestinian
control hold almost ten times that population: 1.1 million
people.
Thus, the much-vaunted principle of autonomy that underlies the
Oslo Accords is a travesty. Israel retains actual control of the
physical bulk of the Occupied Territories. It also retains de
facto control over the entire West Bank (and Gaza Strip).
Economically and socially, the Occupied Territories remain as
vassal states of the feudal overlord.
However, having depressed and impoverished the Territories (as a
study of the Gaza Strip by US academic Sara Roy illustrates),
Israel has chosen to abrogate its responsibilities. Under the
guise of autonomy, it passed responsibility for the poverty and
underdevelopment back to the `civil' control of the Palestinian
Authority. A neat sleight of hand.
Indeed, the principle of `autonomy' that underlies the Oslo
Accords has been caustically rubbished by radical Israeli
journalist Danny Rubenstein. He has characterised it as ``autonomy
as in a POW camp, where the prisoners are autonomous to cook
their meals without interference and to organise cultural events.''
d while current Israeli premier Binyamin Netanyahu has served
to exacerbate tensions in the region since his surprise 1996
election he has, in many respects, simply carried on where his
predecessors left off.
Thus, the supposed `doves' of the Labour government - headed by
Yitzhak Rabin and later Shimon Peres - planned to double the
settler population of the West Bank. They set a target of five
years, from the signing of the first Oslo Accord in 1993, for the
achievement of their goal. By 1996, with official financial
support running to hundreds of millions, the settler
population in the West Bank was growing at an annual rate of ten
percent.
Also worth noting is the fact that it was this selfsame
government that first advanced plans for the building of the
controversial Har Homa/Sur Bahar settlement. Netanyahu's decision
to proceed merely stressed a continuity in official policy.
Currently, the opposition Labour Party is led by one Ehud Barak -
who so precisely detailed the essential weakness of the
Palestinian position in the `peace negotiations'. Barak -
presented as a liberal alternative to the hardline Netanyahu - is
the former Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defence Forces.
US to intervene in Colombia?
Is the United States about to `intervene' in Colombia? Certainly,
the Whitehouse and the US military has become increasingly
concerned at recent guerrilla advances, coupled with the
Colombian military's apparent inability to stem the rebel march.
These concerns turned to outright anxiety following the failure
of a government offensive, in early March. It was the largest
offensive ever mounted by the army against the FARC guerrillas
and centred on the rebel stronghold of Caguan, 600 kilometres
south of Bogota. It proved an ignominious failure and the
government forces withdrew after less than a
week. The defeat was made all the more unpalatable by the fact
that it was led by units of the army's counter-insurgency elite.
Since then, the anxieties that affect the Colombian establishment
have permeated northwards. According to Latin American press
reports (including the excellent Pulsar news service), the head
of the US southern command, General Charles Wilhelm, has
tentatively broached the concept of military
intervention in Colombia, with various Latin American
governments. However, aware of the negative PR that would flow
from images of US Marines `hitting' Colombia's beaches, General
Wilhelm has apparently floated the idea of a `multinational
force' doing battle with the left-wing guerrillas.
Doubtless, Wilhelm (and assorted spooks) will raise the spectre
of a triumphant rebel army `contaminating' Latin and Central
America. The beauty of the `multinational force' is that it has
the successful precedent of the Gulf War `coalition' to look to,
whilst also allowing US intervention to masquerade as a `regional
initiative'.
It is believed the US initiative has already led to the
establishment of `study groups' charged with investigating the
geographical zones controlled by the guerrillas. It is also
rumoured, in the Colombian press, that preparations are being
made for `special operations' against the guerrillas. Colombia borders Venezuela (huge oil reserves), Peru,
Brazil, Ecuador and, most noteworthy of all, Panama. The latter is home to thousands
of US troops.
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