Breaking the Impasse -- A Sinn Fein Declaration
As the talks aimed at securing the establishment of political institutions
ended in failure on Thursday night, Sinn Fein issued the following
statement outlining the party's initiatives to secure the full
implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. It concludes with two
statements - ANNEX 1 and ANNEX 2, which are what Sinn Fein would have been
prepared to sign up to in the context of the establishment of the political
institutions and the implementation in full of the Good Friday Agreement.
(`Following the establishment of Political Institutions by 30th June')
Sinn Fein is totally committed to the implementation of the Good Friday
Agreement in all its aspects. We believe that the whole-hearted
implementation of the Agreement has the capacity to transform the existing
situation through constructive and dynamic political development.
It is a matter of the deepest regret and frustration to Sinn Fein, and
indeed to all who voted for the Agreement on 22 May last year, that the
process of implementation has been repeatedly stalled.
The Agreement, particularly in terms of the political institutions, has
been in default for 12 months as a result of a unionist pre-condition which
is no part of the Good Friday Agreement. There are other aspects of the
Agreement also outstanding.
Human rights, justice and equlaity on political, economic, social and
cultural matters are central requirements. Policing is a key issue. The
impact of demilitarisation on the day to day lives of people would be
widespread. The promised British government strategy to give effect to
this, as required by the Agreement, is yet to be produced.
Despite all of this, in an attempt to save the Agreement, Sinn Fein was
prepared to try to create space for David Trimble. Sinn Fein proposed a
new and far-reaching approach in discussions with the two governments and
the US administration which would allow the UUP to move if it wanted. This
approach went beyone anything we are obliged or required to do under the
terms of the Good Friday Agreement.
Gerry Adams alluded to this in the USA in March when he said there was no
point in Sinn Fein moving if David Trimble was not in the loop - that we
needed to jump together. This would mean stretching the republican
constituency but we made clear that if this had the effect of moving the
process beyond the impasse we were prepared to do this.
Martin McGuinness outlined our ideas to US officials on 5 May and these
were further developed in discussions with the Taoiseach and British Prime
Minister on 6 May.
In Downing Street on 14 May there was an agreement between Sinn Fein, UUP,
SDLP and the British and Irish governments that d'Hondt would be triggered
on the following Thursday, all the institutions would come into place in
shadow formation and that power would be devolved on 1 July.
Despite the subsequent collapse of that deal, Sinn Fein persisted with our
initiative but now, and because of the above, we felt that this could only
work if it had the immediate effect of the full implementation and
operation of the overall Agreement, including in particular, the removal of
the preconditions set by the UUP and the immediate establishment of the
political institutions agreed on Good Friday 1998.
At the core of this approach was:
- A clear statement from the two governments that they were returning to
the Good Friday Agreement;
- That the impasse could be removed only within the terms of the Good
Friday Agreement;
- That there were no preconditions in the Good Friday Agreement;
- That a deadline would be set for the transfer of power to the political
institutions;
- An acknowledgement that all the parties to the Agreement have an
obligation to help bring decommissioning about;
- Our assessment that, in the context of the full implementation of the
overall Agreement, all the participants acting in good faith could
successfully persuade those with guns that decommissioning should take
place within the timeframe set out in the Agreement and Gerry Adams'
preparedness to make a declaration in that regard.
This initiative was to be expressed publicly in
a) A Sinn Fein Declaration - Annex 1; and
b) Elements of an IICD Report acceptable to Sinn Fein - Annex 2.
This approach could only succeed following the immediate establishment of
the institutions by 30 June as promised by the two governments.
This required, in response to Sinn Fein's substantive initiative, UUP
agreement to move into the institutions consistent with the Good Friday
Agreement.
At the beginning of the current phase of negotiations Sinn Fein tabled
papers on these positions, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, informed
Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness that he showed the Sinn Fein position to
the UUP.
In the course of the negotiations Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness
explained our proposals directly, and on two occasions, to the Leader and
Deputy Leader of the UUP.
They also met with and explained the Sinn Fein proposals in detail to the
UUP negotiation team.
Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness requested a meeting with the entire UUP
Assembly team. This request was rejected.
The UUP rejected our proposals late last night.
Tonight, in a final attempt to overcome the impasse and see the political
institutions put in place, we again met with the UUP leadership and showed
them our detailed written proposals. These were again rejected by the UUP.
ANNEX 1
Sinn Fein Declaration
Sinn Fein has long argued that it is only through the full implementation
of the Agreement, in particular the operation of its institutions and the
delivering of equality and justice, that the issue of arms will be finally
and satisfactorily settled. Sinn Fein has also emphasised the key role to
be played by General de Chastelain and his colleagues. We have
specifically said in our reply to the Independent Commission on
Decommissioning that ``the full implementation of the Agreement would
demonstrably facilitate the decommissioning process.''
Sinn Fein acknowledges the UUP statement in response to the Commission's
report that they will now proceed, with the SDLP and Sinn Fein to be part
of the inclusive Executive. Against that background we believe that all of
us, as participants acting in good faith, could succeed in persuading those
with arms to decommissoin them in accordance with the Agreement. We agree
that this should be in the manner set down by the Independent Commission on
Decommissioning within the terms of the Good Friday Agreement.
This reflects our conviction that through the overall implementation of the
Good Friday Agreement we are working to remove the causes of conflict.
Conflict must be finished forever - it must be for all of us a thing of the
past.
ANNEX 2
Elements of an IICD Report Acceptable to Sinn Fein
- Notes that, all the parties are committed to the total disarmament of
all paramilitary organisations and are obliged to use their influence to
bring this about by May 2000.
- Notes that, under the relevant Regulations, different methods of
decommissioning are provided for and also that decommissioning can take
place in accordance with arrangements made with the Commission.
- Recommends that the decommissioning process be advanced this week
through urgent discussions with the parties and a choice from the options
available under the Regulations.
- Recommends that these discussions be conducted urgently so that the
Commission can report to the governments in October.
- Following this, the Commission will recommend the earliest possible
beginning of decommissioning, noting that decommissoining of all
paramilitary arms be concluded by May 2000 as set out above.
- Will submit progress reports to the two Governments in October next, in
December and in May 2000.
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