Colombian army cover up massacre
Worldview
By Dara MacNeil
Last October ominous notices began to appear on the
walls of Puerto Asis, a small town in southern
Colombia. They informed local inhabitants that all
guerrilla ``sympathisers and supporters'' in the area had
been sentenced to death.
The notices also stated that a death squad charged with
responsibility for carrying out the multiple executions
had been sent to the locality.
There were also specific threats issued against named
individuals, among them a priest in the nearby town of
La Hormiga. He took the threats seriously and went into
hiding. Others were not so fortunate.
In early February the executioners duly arrived. In the
towns of Puerto Asis and La Hormiga they murdered 48
people. Most of the dead were lucky enough to have been
killed outright, by gunfire. Some, however, were doused
with petrol and set alight. Their charred corpses were
then dumped in a nearby river.
The reaction of the Colombian security forces was, to
say the least, strange. The standard promise to pursue
and catch the mass murderers was issued. However, the
ability of the Colombian army to do so was undermined
somewhat when senior military officers in the region
professed themselves unaware of the presence of any
armed right-wing groups in the area.
More recently, the army has taken to disputing whether
any killings even took place.
Their professed ignorance flies in the face of local
testimony, the evidence of church figures and even the
word of the alleged head of Colombia's death-squad
network.
The latter individual - Carlos Castano - is also on the
country's `most wanted' list, yet he somehow remains at
liberty and accessible to Colombia's media. He has
insisted that there are ``paramilitary groupings'' (death
squads) in the area. Other authorities, such as local
bishops, have also rubbished the army's remarkable
attempt to cover up death squad activity.
Most telling of all is the testimony provided by
survivors of the massacre.
The same testimony also provides a clue to the anxiety
shown by the army over this latest atrocity.
Thus eyewitnesses are adamant that the perpetrators of
the Puerto Asis/La Hormiga massacre were ferried into
the area aboard ``official helicopters.''
But by raising doubts about the veracity of the
original story, the army has now successfully created
confusion and buried uncomfortable allegations in the
ensuing confusion.
Nonetheless, the army's `doubts' did little to assuage
the fears of the inhabitants of both towns. Visitors to
the area say Puerto Asis and La Hormiga now resemble
``ghost-towns''.
Their flight simply confirms the widely-held view that
such massacres are carried out with the complicity of
Colombia's security forces who, in the words of Human
Rights' Watch ``organise, encourage and mobilise'' the
country's right-wing death squads.
With elections due later this year in Colombia, it
would appear the parties of the right have begun to get
their intimidation in early.
Avoiding another Gulf War
In the words of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, it
will take ``a lot of hard work to unpick'' the agreement
he concluded in Baghdad.
nan was dispatched to the Iraq on what officials in
the White House rubbished beforehand as ``mission
impossible.''
While he negotiated in Baghdad, the increasingly
belligerent Madeleine Albright stated that the US
reserved its ``right'' to strike at Iraq, no matter what
Kofi Annan came home with.
Albright had previously made cheap, tasteless remarks
about the effect of UN sanctions on Iraq's civilian
population, saying that after the proposed airstrikes
Saddam Hussein would need more than ``a band-aid.''
Albright can only have been aware that, as a result of
the sanctions, Iraqi children are dying weekly for want
of vital medical supplies.
Thus, when Annan emerged with an agreement, the
disappointment in some quarters was almost palpable.
Washington refused to comment, claiming the need to
study the agreement further. Slow readers, obviously.
Their `extra study period' was being conducted long
after the majority of the world's powers had read and
signalled their assent for the agreement.
d bear in mind Albright's declaration of the US
``right'' to strike, in whatever circumstances.
We've been here before. In August 1990, Iraq made an
offer to withdraw from Kuwait. The proposal was
dismissed as ``baloney'' in Washington and the Gulf War
went ahead, with the loss of 250,000 lives.
It took a lot of hard work to unpick and ignore that
particular deal too.