Holding tight - a year of living dangerously
Review of 1998
Brian Campbell looks back on a year when the political landscape
changed in the Six Counties
If 1998 in the Six Counties was a white-knuckle rollercoaster ride,
then don't unfasten your seatbelt just yet. The ride isn't over. Not
by a long way.
The year began with the shooting dead of eight nationalists and
reached its historical high point on Good Friday with agreement in
the multi-party talks after a final 36 hours of non-stop
negotiations.
Following referenda to endorse the Agreement and elections to the
Assembly the summer was dominated by the events at Drumcree when
violence in support of the Orange Order led to the deaths of three
small boys, burned to death in Ballymoney. That violence continues.
In August a group opposed to the peace process, the self-styled Real
IRA, exploded a bomb in Omagh which killed 29 people.
The final months of the year has seen the effective stalling of the
peace process as the Ulster Unionists refuse to form the institutions
specified by the Good Friday Agreement until the IRA disarms.
There is no doubt the Agreement was a truly historical moment. But it
wasn't historical in the way that many commentators gushed about at
the time - it didn't change everything utterly. Rather, it changed
the context in which the same forces as before faced each other.
Some cynics might even be saying now that it changed nothing.
Certainly as the year ends the spectacle of Unionists refusing to
implement what was agreed in April - refusing to countenance equality
for nationalists - harks back to an era when everyone knew who held
power in the Six Counties.
But there is nothing new or mysterious in these Unionist tactics.
Their strategy has been there to see throughout 1998 - and for many
years before.
During the course of the entire peace process the Unionists have
sought to play the game long and slow. They want to delay change and,
when change is inevitable, to shape it to their liking. That has been
their way since the first IRA cessation over four years ago. It was
because of the delaying tactics of the Ulster Unionists that it took
so long to bring about talks.
d those tactics continue to this day. David Trimble, in his Nobel
Prize acceptance speech, put it in more homespun language: ``we will
go on all the better if we walk, rather than run''.
Trimble's engagement in the process has always been a pragmatic one.
He realised that the days of old-style Unionist rule would never
return and that he had to redraw the political map, however painful
it was to himself and to his supporters.
d to minimise the pain, their second main objective has been to
seek to exclude Sinn Féin because the demands for real change come
from that party. It has been a constant Unionist refrain from the
start of the peace process that the SDLP and the Ulster Unionists
should cut a deal and exclude Sinn Féin. It surfaced in March, before
the final lap of the talks, when Trimble appealed once again to the
SDLP to do a deal. It has characterised Trimble's performance as
First Minister Designate. And it was written all over the Nobel
acceptance speech which urged constitutionalists to reject republican
``fanatics'' and ``fascists''.
Against the background of these two Unionist objectives - to delay
change and to exclude Sinn Féin - can be viewed the issue which has
consumed more ink and more newsprint than any other in 1998:
decommissioning.
The issue of decommissioning has been raised for three reasons: to
further delay progress, to try to unite all other parties against
Sinn Féin, and to unite Unionism on a reactionary platform.
Trimble knows he is going against the Good Friday Agreement (and that
will be his current tactic's eventual undoing) but he is playing for
time. And he is doing it because he can. The political strength of
the Ulster Unionists allows them to hold up the process for as long,
effectively, as the British government allows them to.
It is only a stalemate because the governments are not prepared to
push for the full implementation of the Agreement. It is a dangerous
game which is based on the false asumption that if an Executive were
formed with Sinn Féin, Trimble would be removed as UUP leader. By
whom and with what alternative policy is not speculated on (because
it is not a realistic scenario).
In effect, the Good Friday Agreement - an international agreement
signed by two governments - is being put aside on the spurious
grounds of internal difficulties within Unionism. That is
unacceptable and it will lead inevitably to angry demands from
nationalists that the Agreement be implemented.
The current difficulties draw the rather obvious comment that
politics is conducted according to the political strength of the
various forces involved. Agreements can be made and can be put to one
side by those who have the political strength to do so. That is as
true in Palestine as it is in the Six Counties.
The only sure guarantee of progress is to build political strength.
It is a lesson well learned by Sinn Féin in 1998. They received their
highest ever poll in the Six Counties - 17.6% in the Assembly
elections - and in three bye-elections in the 26 Counties they
increased their vote.
In the Six Counties Sinn Féin is now the largest party in Belfast and
west of the Bann. That strength limits Trimble's room for manouevre
and makes it harder for those who would return to the politics of
exclusion.
The rollercoaster year also saw Sinn Féin take other, less obvious,
strides forward. The mobilising, lobbying, protesting, and the
rallying of international support which backed up the negotiations,
together with the six weeks of debate around the Good Friday
Agreement (supported by comrades from the ANC) followed by the
Assembly election campaign was an intense learning experience for all
the activists involved. It has left the party much more advanced in
terms of its ability to make change than it was at the beginning of
1998.
That ability will be needed in 1999 as the political struggle turns
on whether the Good Friday Agreement will be implemented. The only
way to ensure the primacy of politics is to set up the political
institutions specified by the Agreement and that will put the onus on
Tony Blair. His government can see the Agreement and all the goodwill
which it generated drain away as the Ulster Unionists cling to the
old agenda. Or Blair can be a persuader for change.
On his decision the future will turn. We'll soon know how rocky the
ride will be in 1999.
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