`Rise to the challenge'
IRA tells parties
In the first interview since the IRA cessation of 20 July, a
spokesperson for the IRA leadership gives an assessment of the
political climate in advance of all-party talks
Phoblacht: The announcement of a renewal of the IRA cessation
on 20 July came as a major surprise to most political
commentators. What were the key factors or changes in the
political climate which influenced the decision to restore the
ceasefire?
IRA: Our announcement of a restoration of the cessation of August
1994 certainly did appear to catch most political commentators on
the hop. But then many of these commentators regularly call it
wrong, particularly with regard to our position.
In any case, the key elements which influenced our decision were
that the new British Labour government moved with some speed
after taking office to deal with the need for all inclusive
negotiations and the new Fianna Fail-led government in the south
moved to help put a peace process back on the rails from an Irish
point of view.
The previous British government, under John Major, had imposed a
number of blocking mechanisms or obstacles to prevent inclusive
and meaningful peace talks taking place. The British government
had known for sometime that before the IRA would again consider a
cessation of military activity they would have to address four
key issues:
1) The removal of the precondition of decommissioning;
2) Setting a time frame for any talks;
3) Immediate entry into talks for Sinn Féin on the basis of its
democratic mandate;
4) Confidence-building measures by the British government.
The new British government moved publicly and speedily to address
these issues. They removed the precondition of decommissioning,
they set a timeframe for substantive talks of between now and May
next year, they made it clear that such talks would be
substantive and inclusive when they were convened on 15 September
and that bi-lateral meetings would start almost immediately after
any announcement of an IRA cessation. They also gave public
commitments to move on a series of confidence-building measures,
including POWs, the Irish language and issues of equality of
treatment.
Both London and Dublin governments have also committed themselves
to the start of negotiations on substantive issues from 15
September.
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The IRA would have problems with sections of the Mitchell
principles. But then the IRA is not a participant in these talks
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Phoblacht: Do you believe there will be all-party negotiations
on 15 September?
IRA: Well, I believe that all-party negotiations are absolutely
necessary for the resolution of the conflict between the British
government and the Irish people. I therefore believe them to be
inevitable. Those elected representatives who would refuse to
participate in all-party negotiations are wreckers trying to hold
back the tide of history. For our part, we took an initiative in
August `94 to enhance the potential for a meaningful peace
process. That historic opportunity was run into the sand. We now
have a second opportunity. We have played our part in restoring
the total cessation of August `94. It is for others to play their
part and rise to the challenge this renewed opportunity presents
them.
We have played our part in restoring the total cessation of
August `94. It is for others to play their part and rise to the
challenge this renewed opportunity presents them
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Phoblacht: Sinn Féin have affirmed the Mitchell principles. Do
you have a view on that and what of your ow view on the Mitchell
principles themselves?
IRA: Sinn Féin is a political party with a very substantial
democratic mandate. What they do is a matter for them. But I
think all Republicans should understand and support them as they
do what they believe is right and necessary to bring about a
lasting peace. Sinn Féin's stated commitment is to secure a peace
settlement which both removes the causes of conflict and takes
all the guns, British, Republican, Unionist, Nationalist and
Loyalist, out of Irish politics. The Sinn Féin position actually
goes beyond the Mitchell principles. Their affirmation of these
principles is therefore quite compatible with their position.
As to the IRA's attitude to the Mitchell Principles per se, well,
the IRA would have problems with sections of the Mitchell
principles. But then the IRA is not a participant in these talks.
Phoblacht: Let me go to the issue of ``consent''. Is there
confusion out there as to the republican version of consent?
IRA: There shouldn't be but there is no doubt that the British
and Unionists have quite deliberately muddled what should be a
clear concept by interpreting consent to mean a political veto.
In doing so they have tried to introduce a new precondition into
the equation in the same way as they previously tried to make
decommissioning a precondition.
For Republicans any political consent requirement must have a
straightforward 32 County context. It must recognise the properly
defined parameters of nationhood and self-determination as
understood in international law. Any consent requirement must be
defined within the context of British withdrawal and encompass
all the people of Ireland. It cannot therefore be shaped with
regard to outside impediment or interference. The idea that a
minority grouping in Ireland, situated within the Six Counties,
should have a veto over political progress in the island as a
whole is anathema to Republicans. Unionists, after all, are in
the majority in only three of the 32 counties of Ireland. I have
no doubt both the Unionists and the British would be among the
first to object if someone was to pick any other three counties
and suggest they be afforded a similar veto.
Phoblacht: In the past the IRA have said there will be no
decommissioning. Has you position changed in any way with regard
to this?
IRA: No, our position on decommissioning has not changed in any
way at all. I don't think anyone has ever realistically expected
us to agree to decommissioning this side of a political
settlement. There is no historical precedent in Ireland for such
a demand. Those who raised the issue in the first instance and
who continue to hype it are interested only in creating an excuse
for their own refusal to engage in meaningful negotiations. The
seriousness with which they take the issue can be fairly well
measured by their lack of focus on any need to decommission the
guns of the RUC, the British army or the 100,000 and more other
`legally' held guns in the Six Counties.
Decommissioning on our part would be tantamount to surrender. It
was irresponsible of the last British government to try to use
the opportunity provided by our initiative in August 1994 to
secure an IRA surrender. It would therefore be doubly
irresponsible if the present British government went on that same
fruitless pursuit again. Decommissioning should not be allowed to
become a distraction from the need for meaningful neogitations.
Those with a genuine interest in developing a peace process which
has the potential for producing a just and lasting peace will
have no interest in decommissioning beyond the point where all
guns are silent.