The United Irish in South Ulster
BY BRIAN MAC DONALD
The 16th Annual Fearghal O'Hanlon Memorial Lecture was held in
Monaghan on Sunday 23 November with 150 people present. The
proceedings were chaired by local Sinn Féin chairperson Seán
Conlon who welcomed the attendance. He noted the
multi-denominational and cross-party nature of the audience, as
appropriate at the first of a series of Sinn Féin events to mark
the 200th anniversary of the United Irish Revolution of 1798.
The keynote speaker was Monaghan historian Brian MacDonald. He
was formally thanked for his learned address by Councillor
Pádraigín Uí Mhurchú, sister of Volunteer Fearghal O'Hanlon who
died with his comrade Sean Sabhat at Brookeborough on 1 January
1957.
We carry here extracts from the lecture showing the growth of the
United Irish movement in South Ulster and the counter-revolution
against it.
Just as the 1840s was a watershed in the social history of
Ireland with the enormous consequences of An Gorta Mór, so too
the 1790s can truthfully be described as pivotal in the political
history of the Irish nation. Republicanism, loyalism, organised
Orangeism, modern Catholicism, unionism and separatism, all can
trace their origins to this period. Yet if we read our histories,
it is as if South Ulster remained untouched by the events of this
decade.
The fixation of traditional histories with the machinations of
political leaderships and with great battles, has reinforced a
tendency to look at the United Irishmen as an east coast
phenomenon, encompassing Antrim and Down, Dublin and south
Leinster, with the occasional nod to Humbert's advance and
Killala to Ballinamuck and the insurgents' stand at Tara. For the
rest of the country, it is as if little of note occurred.
Yet, if we are to understand the full significance of the United
Irishmen and to this epoch in our history, then it is essential
that we look beyond the narrow view of revolution and see that
the 1790s were primarily a contest between diametrically opposed
ideologies - on the one side the hierarchical notion of society
in which individuals and nations were subject with a `social
order'; on the other, the democratic analysis which argued that
people are created equal and that the idea of subjection, whether
of the individual or of a people, is anathema. In this war of
ideas, south Ulster was in the front line and so long as the
national structure remained intact, the United Irishmen of this
region constituted a formidable threat to the social, political
and military establishment.
There seemed to be no stopping the momentum that had been created
by the United Irish. Worse still was the dawning realisation that
the women were as bad if not worse than the men.
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Throughout the 1790s, the authorities were bewildered and alarmed
at the speed with which news spread, and the degree to which the
people were developing political views. This was achieved through
the barrage of information being circulated by the United
Irishmen. In addition to the United Irish paper the Northern
Star, radical books, magazines, sermons, ballads and even radical
interpretations of prophecies, were used to influence people.
From Clones, the agent of the Lennard-Barret estate observed that
the Presbyterians of Stonebridge were much given to reading
Thomas Paine and had imbued a dangerous democratic spirit. And
when the United Irish leader Thomas Russell was visiting his
sister in Fermanagh in April 1793, he encountered a Methodist
preacher who told him that people were informed of political
events even in places `where you could not conceive that any news
could reach', in the mountains and bogs of Cavan, Fermanagh and
Leitrim.
Linen merchants and the carmen who transported goods across the
province carried with them concealed compartments packed with
radical literature. In 1796 we find John Shaw, a linen merchant
of Lisburn, a Quaker and a United Irishman, staying amongst the
Quakers of Cootehill. In the same period, Barney McMahon, a
Catholic United Irishman, was acting as an emissary from Belfast
to the remote areas of Monaghan, Cavan, Leitrim and Fermanagh,
establishing contact with the Defenders.
Furthermore, merchants and others who spent time in Belfast were
liable to return home imbued with United Irish sentiments.
Given all of these factors, it is hardly surprising that the
authorities regarded Belfast as the source of the democratic
contagion and were especially delighted when soldiers of the
Monaghan Militia destroyed the printing presses of the Northern
Star in the summer of 1797. By then, however, the damage had been
done and a revolutionary movement was in place which, even a
decade earlier, nobody could have anticipated.
In his narrative of the period, the Templepatrick weaver and
United Irish activist, Jemmy Hope describes how in the year 1796,
he set about his work as an organiser in South Ulster and parts
of Connacht:
``Having assisted in forming the Co Monaghan Committee in
Castleblayney on a market day, when several very respectable
linen merchants were there, we planted the union at
Maguiresbridge, Clones, Enniskillen, Ballinamore, Cashcarrigan,
Carrick-on-Shannon and Strokestown... and on our return home,
formed committees in Ballyhays, Butlersbridge and
Newtownhamilton.''
There seemed to be no stopping the momentum that had been created
by the United Irish. Worse still was the dawning realisation that
the women were as bad if not worse than the men.
Henry Clements gave an account of developments in Cootehill,
County Cavan in mid-April 1797:
``It is not possible to conceive the change that has taken place
in the sentiment of the people of this country within the last
month. I had then a list of 40 men of Ashfield anxious to join
us, I shall not find it difficult to make out eleven fit to carry
arms. Every man and woman are now united; I almost doubt whether
there is one in forty that is not. They publicly declare
themselves and such people as wished to be well effected were
obliged to join them out of fear. They constantly wear the badge
of their order, the men a green stock and a bit of green riband
in their breasts and such as have watches, of which there appears
numbers of the linen merchants in Cootehill, a green watch
string. The women [wear] a green handkerchief and riband with
shoe knots of the same.
They have of late given the supporters of government a new title,
that of Loyalists. The houses for swearing in those UI are as
public as whiskey houses, particularly one at the end of the
bridge of Cootehill. Stewart the Presbyterian parson... or his
daughter constantly attend for that purpose. All the people that
quit our corps were his heres [hearers] and it is not supposed
there are more than five or six people in Cootehill that are not
united.''
The counter-revolutionary strategy adopted by the authorities had
two objectives: either `to lance the boil' by forcing the United
Irishmen into outright insurrection, a contest which they felt
confident they could handle; or to break the union by sowing the
seeds of sectarian animosity between the denominations.
The strategy had several elements; the first, proposed by Lord
Belmore of Castlecoole as early as mid April, was to proclaim an
amnesty for anyone who came forward, renounced the United
Irishmen, handed in whatever weapons they held, swore an oath of
allegiance and, depending on their economic circumstances, gave
security for their future good behaviour; the second was to
launch a campaign of state terror in which tactics proposed by
Lord Blayney were to play a major part. As part of this strategy,
the normal legal process would be suspended when dealing with
suspected political offenders. The third element was to encourage
the Orange Order, arm loyalists generally and persuade the clergy
and individual congregations of various denominations to publicly
declare loyalty and disassociate themselves from the Untied
Irishmen.
This period of intense repression began for the people of south
Ulster at Leysborough about half a mile from Newbliss on the road
to Swann's Cross on 20 May 1797. hearing reports that `numerous
body' had assembled `under the pretence of setting potatoes',
Alexander Kerr led his troop of Yeomanry and a party of the North
Lowland Fencibles to the place. He described what happened next.
``When I got within sight of them I walked the troop to give them
time to disperse, and when I came up to them I halted for a
considerable time from the same notion; however, finding they
were determined to stand their ground, I made part of my troop
get into the same field and form in front of them, while I
proceeded with the remainder to flank them; they let me ride
quite close to them and when I desired them to disperse took no
notice. I then fired a pistol over their heads and ordered the
troop to charge them; some fled, while others made resistance
with their spades (for it appeared they had not any firearms,
which from their keeping their ground so confidently I was
induced to think they had). From every information that I can get
six of the deluded wretches were killed, several severely wounded
and fourteen made prisoners. There were about three hundred of
them in the field exclusive of great numbers upon all the
adjacent hills...''
This is the official version of events and from Henry Clements,
we get further details.
``He [Ker] ordered the men to fire which killed five. The rest
made off but were pursued by both infantry and cavalry who cut
them down wherever they could catch them. They took to a swamp at
Lessbrough and were pursued by the infantry, but what number were
killed I did not hear. One of the cavalry men told his relation
who came to me that he saw one man wanting an arm and another a
hand...
``A person who I sent to now the particulars of what happened at
Newbliss in this instant returned. He says there were eleven
killed, that the number of wounded is very great. They were
bringing them to Cootehill all yesterday evening and this morning
to an O'Donel to be dressed. The prisoners he has taken to
Monaghan.''
Having embarked on a repressive strategy, and heartened by
reports that the United Irishmen had had a setback (presumably
word from their leadership that the French expedition had been
indefinitely delayed), loyalists began to take heart, Clements
stating that `numbers of Orangemen who had joined them are ready
to come to us and the spirit of the United men seems entirely
lost'. What neither Clements, nor other pro-government
correspondents realised was that in addition to being told of the
postponement of the French invasion, the United Irishmen were
getting word from their leadership to calm the situation down and
to cease overt activities that would expose themselves in advance
of a general uprising.
In the eyes of the establishment, however, the sudden tranquility
was misinterpreted as a sign of weakness.
In late 1796 Lord Blayney, a Lieutenant Colonel Major in the 89th
Regiment, returned to Ireland from foreign service and
immediately set about establishing a Yeomanry corps in
Castleblayney. Although a member of the aristocracy, he was at
first regarded as a reformer both by the radicals and by the
administration which was deeply suspicious of him. When Henry
Alexander wrote to the Dublin Castle authorities from Armagh
reporting the dejection of the bar following the outcome of the
Spring Assizes in Monaghan, he described Blayney as being `by no
means amicable to your administration', but added significantly
that it as the same Blayney who now opposed the notion that a
parliamentary reform might be introduced as a means of making the
people `peaceable and sweet'.
Clearly, Lord Blayney had undergone a change of heart since his
return to Castleblayney, `in consequence', he said, `of reports
to his Excellency of great disturbance being in that
neighbourhood'. Pointing out that `the country round about wrote
me an address saying it as their object and wish to puruse good
order', he suggested in April that the constables in the locality
had the situation under control'. Within a month, Blayney was
pursuing a more active role and was in contact with Lord
Carhampton and with the Chief Secretary, Thomas Pelham, outlining
his plan for a `flying camp' or mobile military force. The
government, desperate for whatever help it could get, gave its
support and on 22 May, Blayney and his mobile force launched an
offensive on the United Irishmen in the Glaslough district. In a
letter to government, he wrote:
``Nothing can be really effectual but retaliation in point of
destroying property, burning houses and setting the inhabitants
to the mercy of the elements, by which means you will either
force them to action or make them surrender the arms.''
While precise details of his attack on Glaslough are unclear,
beyond the known fact that there were multiple arrests of
suspected rebels, Alexander indicated that an iron-glove strategy
had been adopted and that this would strengthen the government's
hand:
``The Glaslough business had had the best possible effect as a
proof of the celebrity and secrecy with which government can act.
The fellows apprehended treat trial as a mockery and expect the
honour of martyrdom without being exposed to the sufferings. Many
of the more desperate in Aughnacloy and Caledon sleep away from
their homes. If Lord Blayney wavered before he offered his
services, nothing can be more decided than his now exertions... I
have been through the fair today and never knew a better effect
produced than by the Glaslough business.''
Pelham gave Blayney the go-ahead for further similar actions,
describing his exertions as `laudable'. Replying to Alexander,
Pelham made an intriguing comment which suggests that Blayney's
tactics in Glaslough were especially brutal: `I only hope that
you will temper his zeal without checking it,' he wrote.
Much of Blayney's efforts were concentrated in Armagh and Tyrone.
In the Creggan area of south Armagh around the town of Forkhill,
he boasted of the steps he had taken against the local
population. Writing to Lord Glentworth in early June, he said:
I was told I could not go wrong; had information of three drills
that night. Impossible to come across them ut no person was in
their houses at 3 o'clock in the morning so I burned 22 houses
and one man I had strong reason to suspect saw returning from
those associations so rode up and cut him down. I burned the
house and property of a leading man named Donaldson... I found a
man had been attempting to corrupt a man of the Cavan Militia on
parade... I sentenced the man to be flogged round the town
[Forkhill]; suppose he received 300. It is useless crowding the
jails. Advice - If you are disengaged and will take a trip down,
you may see some amusement with those native and I can give you a
tent. Our quarters are uncertain.''
There is every reason to believe that similar tactics were
employed in mid and south Monaghan and we can safely assume that
it was Lord Blayney who was responsible for the destruction of
the village of Blackstaff in Farney which prior to this period
had up to 200 houses and more than 1,000 people.
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