Trimble's Orange cord
BY MICHEAL MacDONNCHA
John Bruton is not renowned for his perfect timing or
well-directed political interventions. Last weekend he made a
statement which misinterpreted the Sinn Féin position on the
issue of unionist consent and inferred that republicans should
accept a unionist veto; the next day the extent of the unionist
veto on the Irish policy of the Major government was revealed in
a leaked government memo.
The confidential memo which was revealed in a British Sunday
newspaper was from a private meeting between Ulster Unionist
leader David Trimble and British Political Development Minister
Michael Ancram. The memo said Trimble sought a personal veto from
the British government to allow him to call a halt to
negotiations. He wanted a special ``communications cord to halt
talks if required''. He wanted to know what would happen in the
event of an IRA ceasefire if Sinn Féin ``showed at the gate'' of
the talks. His concern was to keep the party out using the
decommissioning demand.
On the eve of the suspension of the Stormont talks on Wednesday 5
March Dublin government sources were acknowledging to the media
that unionists were not willing to engage in negotiations with
Sinn Féin even in the event of a renewed IRA ceasefire.
The Tory loss of the Wirral by-election last week makes Major
even more dependent on Trimble if he wishes to survive for a few
more weeks in order to be able to name his preferred general
election date. Trimble's glittering prize - the pompously named
Northern Ireland Grand Commmittee at Westminster - was unveiled
last week. But his more far-reaching success has been to ensure
that Major does nothing to turn the flawed Stormont talks into
real negotiations. Major has so far failed to give a positive
response to Gerry Adams's Irish Times article of 22 February
which sought to clarify the Sinn Féin position in a way which
allowed space to the British government.
In the context of British government negativity and their playing
of lobby politics with intransigent unionism, the comments of
John Bruton on the issue of consent were particularly unhelpful.
He wrongly accused republicans of advocating coercion of
unionists; he then spuriously linked this with the demand for
decommissioning. Thus a few days before the Stormont talks are
suspended without a word of real negotiations over nine months,
with decommissioning having totally dominated the proceedings,
John Bruton gave unionists a further argument for delay.
Nonetheless, the primary responsibility for the failure of the
talks lies with the British government. It is for the leadership
of the British Labour Party now to assess this failure and learn
lessons. Several times during the peace process, before the
ending of the IRA cessation, they urged Major to move forward,
pointing out that they had a bi-partisan approach and letting it
be known that they would not bring down his government if the
unionists tried to topple him over the peace process. Major, if
he had the political will, could have built on this and
consolidated the process. In the end it was clear that the issue
of Ireland was never a high enough priority for him.
The task of republicans is to ensure that for Labour the issue is
a much higher priority. That means republicans giving as much
attention to the need for political engagement in Britian as they
have in the United States. Such an engagement has been a missing
link in the peace process; it is a question which needs to be
explored in greater detail in the run up to the British general
election.